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ment of various degrees, compels men to labor without pay for its good; even
deprives men of life if it pleases; assumes arbitrary control of the life, liberty and happiness of an individual if it considers ot necessary for the public
welfare,, and no reasonable human being questions its right or duty to do these
things. And at the same time it allows its deformed and diseased in mind,
body and soul to disseminate social leprosy and cancer with impunity, while
the skill of its surgeons could prevent the infection by an oberation almost as
simple as vaccination. The wonder is that the remedy which we propose
should have been so long delayed.

CASE AND COMMENT
Pooling Agreements May Be Enforced in Equity.-Tobacco pools
were greatly strengthened February 18th, by a decision in the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, holding that pooling agreements are such as can be
enforced in equity by injunction, when the pooling contracts contain a provision that "upon failure to fully comply with the terms and agreement of
the contract the pooler agrees to pay the society as liquidated damages 2.0
per cent of the value of the tobacco for the benefit of the members of the
society." The case was the Grant County Board of Control and the Burley
Tobacco Society against A. S. Allphinn, in which the Fayette Circuit Court
is reversed. Allphinn was accused of shipping his tobacco to Lexingtton to
be sold out of the pool. His pooling contract contained such provision, and
the court said the question presented was "whether a court of equity may enjoin a breach of contract, notwithstanding the provision for specific damages
therefor," and decided that the answer depends upon whether it was the
intention of the parties that the contract should be fulfilled or whether it was
to be optional either to fulfill the contract or pay the sum stipulated as liquidated damages. In this case the court held that it must have been the intention of the parties to fulfill the contract, and that the sum stipulated was
merely security that the contract would be lived up to.
"The very life of the undertaking on which the appellees were engaged
depended upon whether or not a considerable number of growers would
pool their tobacco for sale through the appellants," said the court. "If the
poolers were allowed to sell in violation of the contract, the aim of the pool
would be defeated, and the sum agreed upon would not liquidate the damage
or be an adequate compensation."
Special Damages-How Pleaded-Evidence.-It was held in Lexington &
Eastern Ry. Co., et al. vs. Fields, 152 Ky. 19, that if a plaintiff in a personal
injury case desires to recover for medical expenses incurred in the treatment
of the injuries complained of, he should state in his pleading the amount so
expended, or the amount that he has expended and that it will be necessary
to expend in securing necessary medical attention. Blue Grass Traction Co.
vs. Ingles, 140 Ky. 488. A previous petition averring that the plaintiff incurred
dollars in expense in medical treatment is not sufficient to authorize a
recovery for any expense on account of medical treatment, as it does not
show that any sum was expended for this purpose. Lexington Railway Co.
vs. Britton, 130 Ky. 676. When a 'matter in issue is so defectively pleaded
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as not to warrant an instruction, and the party offers evidence in support of
the matter so defectively pleaded, and there is no objection to its introduction,
the adverse party will not be heard after the court has properly instructed
the jury and the verdict has been returned, to complain of the admission of
the evidence and the instruction based on it. Instructions should be confined
to issues made by the pleadings, but if a matter put in issue by the evidence
is defectively pleaded, or the scope of the pleading does not include the offered
evidence, the adverse party should object to the introduction of the evidence,
and If he fails to do this, will be deemed to have waived the error committed by the court in instructing the jury upon a matter that the pleading,
strictly construed, did not authorize, although a general exception may be
saved to the instruction.
Liability of Carrier for Unlawful Arrest of Passenger.-In Louisville &
Nashville R. R. Co. vs. Byrley, 152 Ky. 35, it was held that in an action for
damages by a passenger against a carrier for unlawful arrest, the declaration
of the arresting officer that he was a railroad detective is not competent to
prove the fact of agency, or the extent of his authority. However, the carrier Is liable for the unlawful arrest of a passenger, made by its agent while
acting within the scope of his authority. It was further held that when an
arrest is made by officers of the law, and is apparently regular, and there Is
nothing to put the conductor on notice that the arrest is illegal, the company
cannot be held for a failure on his part to interfere with the officers to prevent
the arrest, but when the conductor knows, or the facts and circumstances
known to him are such as to apprise a person of ordinary prudence that the
arrest is unlawful, the company is liable.
Marriage Valid Where Contracted, but.invalid Where Parties Reside, as
Within Power of Court Where Parties Reside to Annul.-In Cunningham
vs. Cunningham (N. Y.) 99 N. E. 845, it was held that the New York courts
had power to annul a marriage performed in New Jersey between residents
of New York who went to New Jersey merely to get married and immediately
returned to New York, it appearing that while the contract of marriage
was valid in New Jersey, it was invalid in New York, the wife being at the
time of the niarriage under the age of legal consent, and the marriage having
taken place without the knowledge or consent of her payents. The court said:
"I do not question the validity of marriage contracts made in other states conformatory to the laws of such state, or that they will be recognized as
valid in this state, unless they are contrary to the prohibition of natural
laws, or to the express provisions of our statute. We would not, In this state,
recognize a contract of marriage in another state in several instances, such
as between a father and a daughter, or where the consent was procured
through force, duress or fraud, etc. We do recognize the remarriage of a
former husband or wife who has been divorced and has been forbidden to
again marry, where such remarriage took place in a state in which it was
authorized. But this Is upon the ground that the forbidding to remarry was
In the nature of a penalty which had no effect outside of this state. Werner,
J., dissented and In his opinion said: "It has long been definitely settled in
our courts that the validity of a marriage Is to be determined by the law of
the state where it was entered into. If valid there, it is to be recognized as
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such in the courts of this state, unless contrary to the prohibition of the
natural law, or the express prohobitions of a statute. Although every state
can regulate the status of its own citizens, yet in the absence of express
words we cannot infer a legislative intent to contravene the jus gentium under
which the validity of a marriage contract is referred to the lex loci contractus.
Such an intent cannot be attributed to the legislature unless it is clearly
and unmistakably expressed in the statute. Van Voorhis vs. Brintnall, 86 U.
Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505. And this is true, even when parties domiciled here
visit other jurisdictions for the sole purpose of contracting marriages forbidden by our own statutes. Thorp vs. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am. Rep. 189;
Moore vs. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521, 44 Am. Rep. 408."--Law Notes.
Validity of "Jim Crow Act" as to Interstate Travelers.-In Alabama, etc.,
R. Co. vs. Morris (Miss.) 60 So. 11, it was held that a statute of Mississippi
lequiring equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races
in passenger trains applied to interstate travelers aboard trains forming a
part of a chain of carriers engaged in the business of transporting passengers taken up within the state for carriage to a point without the state, and
was not an invasion of the national authority to regulate and control corn.
merce between the states. The constitutionality of the statute .was assailed
in an action by a woman passenger bound for New York on a train of the
defendant, for damages for distress of mind and body due to being obliged to
occupy a Pullman car in which were colored passengers. It was held that the
action would lie. The court said: "The legislature, in the exercise of its
powers to police the highways of commerce running through the state, enacted the statute in question to promote the peace, comfort and general
welfare of the public. The statute was not enacted with any idea of discriminating against the members of either race; nor was it prompted by
prejudice or passion, but with the knowledge that the enforced intermingling
of the races would be distasteful to both races, would inevitably result in
discomfort to both, and provoke and encourage conflicts endangering the
peace and quiet of the commonwealth. True, the application of the statute
to interstate trains necessarily imposes an additional expense upon the carrier. This carrier would be required to provide another Pullman, or to divide
the one used into separate compartments; but it has been decided time and
again that merely an additional expenditure of money will not render a statute so requiring susceptible to criticism. This statute has been upon our
books for many years, and has caused no complaint or criticism from the
inhabitants of the state. The two races here accept the law as a wise and
necessary exercise of the police power of the state for the protction of members of both races. No greater punishment could be inflicted 'upon the average negro traveler than being obliged to sit in the coach set apart for whites,
and our colored fellow citizens would be the first to oppose a repeal of the
statute. . . . The ultimate settlement of the question rests with the Supreme
Court of the United States; and, until that great court decides against the
validity of the statute as construed by us, we feel impelled to adhere to our
belief that the law is not only beyond criticism from a constitutional standpoint, but is also a reasonable and wise exercise of the police power of the
state."-Law Notes.

